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Foreword: The Hearsay Reform Conference
The New Wave of Hearsay Reform
Scholarship
Roger C. Park*
Issues on the hearsay borderland have always appealed to
evidence teachers, but core issues of hearsay policy have sometimes received less attention. For a time at least, evidence
scholars were more interested in the riddles of implied assertions and nonverbal conduct than in the core question whether
undoubted hearsay ought to be received freely. This neglect of
the core cannot be explained by any test of social importance.
The question whether the system of trial by live testimony
should be fundamentally altered is as important as any issue
confronting proceduralists. If nothing else, the amount of judicial energy expended on the hearsay rule would justify a careful examination of its value. (As a rough measure, note that
twenty-five percent of the annotations devoted to the Federal
Rules of Evidence in the United States Code Annotated address
hearsay.) Moreover, the hearsay ban seems a glaring anomaly
in a trial system that generally favors free proof, and that gen-erally trusts factfinders to discount unreliable evidence. Nonetheless, for two or three decades following the middle of this
century, there was little academic writing about fundamental
hearsay issues. My guess is that scholars became disheartened
* Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota, and
organizer of the Hearsay Reform Conference, held at the University of Minnesota Law Center in September, 1991. The articles in this symposium are based
on papers presented at that conference. I am pleased to salute the authors of
those papers and the fifty-five evidence professors who attended. I am especially grateful to my dean, Robert A. Stein, for his encouragement and tangible aid, and to my colleagues Steven D. Penrod, Daniel A. Farber, and Robert
J. Levy. In organizing and managing the conference, I received invaluable
help from my secretary, Jill Braithwaite, who will soon be a member of the
class of 1995 at the University of Minnesota Law School. I also owe special
thanks to Richard Friedman, who suggested the idea of a conference on hearsay, and to Suzanne Park, for her hard work and astute advice.
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about their chances of having an effect on hearsay law, and at
any rate felt that they had nothing new to say.
The generation of hearsay reformers whose ranks included
Wigmore, Morgan and McCormick did thoughtful and often
brilliant work. However, the results were discouraging. On the
surface, nothing much happened in response to their work.
The Model Code of Evidence was an utter failure, in large part
because of its radical relaxation of the rule against hearsay.
The discretionary approach to admission of hearsay envisioned
by the original drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence became steadily less radical as it progressed through the rulemaking and congressional process. The rules finally emerged
as a typical list of class exceptions, supplemented by a residual
exception seemingly hedged with restrictions.
The thoroughness of the Wigmore-Morgan generation, and
the durability of its insights in the absence of doctrinal change,
made it more difficult for scholars to find new perspectives.
Doctrinal scholarship feeds on doctrinal change, and for a time
there was not much to stimulate those who might otherwise
have been interested in hearsay reform.
Times have changed, for three reasons. First, the law has
started to change. There have been dramatic legislative
changes in other English-speaking nations. As Professor Allen
points out in his contribution to this issue, these deserve our
careful attention. In the United States, change has been less
obvious, but perhaps just as profound. Many observers believe
that liberal judicial interpretation, particularly of the residual
exceptions and the expert witness rules, have shaken the foundations of the hearsay ban. In civil cases, procedural changes
not formally classified as part of evidence law-for example, increased use of summary judgment and of alternative methods
of dispute resolution-may have the effect of making resort to
full trial with cross-examination of eyewitnesses relatively less
common, thereby weakening the impact of the hearsay ban. In
criminal cases, significant doctrinal development has occurred
in caselaw interpreting the hearsay-excluding aspect of the
right to confrontation. Confrontation issues came alive for academic lawyers after the Supreme Court's ruling in 1965 that
the Confrontation Clause applied to the states,1 and fundamental questions about the scope of the Clause are being actively
debated in commentary and in the courts.
1.

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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Second, legal scholarship has more to say about hearsay because it has acquired additional tools. For example, until recently the proposition that jurors are competent to evaluate
hearsay had not really been tested by any measure other than
common sense. For this reason, one would expect the new
wave of hearsay scholarship to include examination of empirical issues with the methods of social science, and this symposium includes articles representing this approach. Moreover,
the procedure of excluding hearsay, and requiring in its place
firsthand testimony when that is available, has costs that can
usefully be analyzed using the tools of microeconomics, as Professor Friedman demonstrates in his contribution. The reader
will also note the influence of concepts from decision analysis
and probability theory in the contribution of Professors Tillers
and Schum. Finally, while the idea that one might learn by examining other systems is not new to legal scholarship, it has
been underutilized in the hearsay context. In his contribution,
Professor Dama~ka examines continental analogues to the
hearsay rule, notes differences between legal environments
that explain a different treatment of derivative proof, and adds
a note of caution about change of the American system.
Third, scholars who write about hearsay policy in criminal
cases have new things to say because they have views about the
goals of hearsay exclusion that are different from those of the
Wigmore-Morgan generation. That generation's case for reform was founded, expressly or implicitly, upon the belief that
free proof would enhance accuracy in fact-finding. A reductionist view of the dangers against which the hearsay rule was directed led to relatively simple solutions to the hearsay problem.
If the hearsay rule, and the hearsay aspect of confrontation
doctrine, are perceived as being more than merely misguided
efforts to protect jurors from factfinding failures, then the case
for abolition or radical reform is not so simple. The due process
revolution of the Warren Court, accompanied by the increased
visibility of the confrontation right after 1965, has caused the
hearsay wing of confrontation doctrine to be examined by
scholars coming from a new perspective. Today, a number of
scholars are inclined to view the exclusion of out-of-court statements as a way of protecting individual rights from the intrusion of government, or as a way of influencing the conduct of
police and prosecutors in the process of preparing and preserving evidence. Several of the articles in this issue reflect a complex understanding of the process goals served by hearsay and
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confrontation doctrine, and hence a more complicated view of
the path that reform might take.
In short, the three forces of new law, new tools, and new
goals have revived inquiry about fundamental issues of hearsay
reform. But readers should not treat this foreword as proof of
the truth of what it asserts. They should turn the page and see
for themselves.
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